针对共同物流运作特点,以博弈论为工具分析了共同物流各成员行为模式,由此建立共同物流参与企业间的非零和动态合作博弈模型。分析了博弈模型中求解的两种常用方法存在的不足,即Shapley值法和核心法解空间不存在问题,提出了改进的核心法,同时对采用改进的核心法所求解结果作为合作风险分担方案的合理性和稳定性进行了论证,以此形成在共同物流运作中建立风险公益金制度的理论基础,最后举例进行了分析说明。 In view of the characteristics of common logistics operation, this paper analyzes the behavior patterns of members of common logistics by using game theory as a tool, and establishes a non-zero-sum dynamic cooperation game model of common logistics participating enterprises. This paper analyzes the deficiencies of two commonly used methods in the game model, that is, the non-existence of Shapley value method and the core method solution space, proposes an improved core method, and at the same time, uses the improved core method to solve the result as the cooperative risk sharing solution The rationality and stability of the demonstration were carried out to establish the theoretical foundation for establishing a public welfare risk fund system in the common logistics operation. Finally, an example was given to illustrate the analysis.