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国有企业经理报酬制度的制定涉及到保险与激励两个问题,要求既能保证国有资产的保值与增值,又能克服经理潜在的道德风险,防止经理为获取个人的高收入而在经营中采取过分的冒险行为,同时又可以激励经理努力工作,在追求个人期望收益最大化的同时,最大化企业的市场价值。基于此,本文首先研究了在国有企业中实行线性合同的可行性,然后讨论了经理经营绩效的评价问题,最后结合我国的实际情况探讨了两类线性合同模型。
The formulation of managerial remuneration system for state-owned enterprises involves both insurance and incentives. It requires both ensuring the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets, overcoming the manager’s potential moral hazard, and preventing managers from overtaking in order to obtain personal high income. The risk-taking behavior can also inspire the manager to work hard and maximize the market value of the company while pursuing the maximization of personal expectations. Based on this, this paper first studies the feasibility of implementing linear contracts in state-owned enterprises, and then discusses the evaluation of managers’ operating performance. Finally, the two types of linear contract models are discussed based on the actual situation in China.