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我国现行证券法在余股处置制度设计方面仍为空白,一定程度上缺乏私有化收购方与目标公司小股东保护之对等性,对小股东的过度保护的实质后果是博弈僵局,双方均无法达致各自的原本目的。故而,有必要赋予私有化收购方与公司小股东各自选择“抛开”对方的权利,缔造持有极少数剩余股份的余股股东的退出权与持有绝大多数股票的收购方大股东的挤出权之间的平衡机制。同时,在适用余股强制挤出制度之际,当辅之以相应的配套制度,保障“挤出”小股东时的透明与公平。
In our country, the current securities law is still blank in designing the system of remaining stock disposal. To some extent, it lacks the equivalence of the protection of the minority shareholders of the target acquirer and the privatization purchaser. The substantial consequence of overprotection to the minority shareholders is the game deadlock. Achieve their original purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to give the privatization acquirers and the minority shareholders the right to choose each other, to create the right of exit of the remaining shareholders holding the very small number of remaining shares, and to the acquirer holding the vast majority of the shares The balance mechanism between shareholders’ right of extrusion. At the same time, while applying the system of forced squeeze out of surplus shares, when supplemented by the corresponding supporting system, the transparency and fairness of the “squeeze out” minority shareholders will be guaranteed.