现代西方产权经济学理论认为:在委托人与代理人之间,由于信息不对称和监督机制不完善,代理人会出现偷懒、搭便车、机会主义行为,即所谓的“道德风险”。企业经理(经营者)由于掌握大量“隐蔽信息”,因而有可能为自己谋取私利。类似地,职工也会出现出工不出力,上班干私活,不珍惜企业财物等现象。显然,“道德风险”的泛滥将会直接导致企业内部凝 The theory of modern Western property rights economics holds that between the principal and the agent, due to the information asymmetry and the imperfect supervision mechanism, the agent will appear to be lazy, free rider, and opportunist, which is the so-called “moral risk”. Corporate managers (operators) may be able to seek personal gain for themselves because they have a large amount of “hidden information”. Similarly, employees will also be unable to work hard, go to work privately, do not cherish the phenomenon of corporate property. Obviously, the proliferation of “moral hazards” will directly lead to internal condensation