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在医疗服务过程中,由于医生与患者之间的信息非对称而引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题会使具有信息优势的医生损害患者的利益,因此,患者如何对医生进行有效的甄别与激励是一个十分重要的问题。结果表明,患者应对不同服务能力的医生设计形式的不同的激励机制。双重非对称信息下的激励机制不仅能对医生起到自我选择的甄别作用,还能起到激励医生提高工作努力水平的激励作用。
In the process of medical service, adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the asymmetric information between doctors and patients will make information-advantaged doctors harm the interests of patients. Therefore, how to effectively screen and motivate doctors is A very important question. The results show that patients respond to different incentives for physicians to design different forms of services. Incentive mechanism under double asymmetric information can not only act as a self-selection screening for doctors, but also as a motivating factor to encourage doctors to improve their work effort.