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基于四阶段Stackelberg动态博弈分析,构建了双寡头零售商分销渠道产品质量控制策略模型,分析了传统零售渠道和混合渠道结构中不同参数变量对制定产品质量控制策略的影响,并探讨了供应商分散式决策和集中式决策下不同渠道结构中如何制定产品质量控制策略的问题。通过模型分析,可以证明:供应商所提供的产品质量水平随着零售商增值服务水平的上升而增加,随着顾客需求价格弹性系数的上升而下降;随着零售商增值服务水平的上升,零售价格、批发价格、顾客需求量及供应商的期望利润均增加,但零售商的期望利润将会减少;在传统零售渠道供应商集中式决策时,产品质量水平与双寡头零售商增值服务水平之和呈正比,在混合渠道供应商集中式决策时,产品质量水平高于仅存在电子直销渠道时但低于传统零售渠道时,将激发顾客的潜在需求,市场总需求最大,有效消除分销渠道中的双重边际效应。最后,通过算例分析,为该模型在实践中的具体应用指明了方向。
Based on the four-stage Stackelberg dynamic game theory, this paper constructs the strategy model of product quality control for duopoly retailers and analyzes the influence of different parameters on the quality control strategy of traditional retail channels and mixed channel structure. How to formulate product quality control strategies in different channel structures under centralized decision-making and centralized decision-making. Through the model analysis, it can be proved that the level of product quality provided by suppliers increases with the increase of retailers’ value-added services and decreases with the increase of price elasticity of customer demand. As the value-added service of retailers increases, the retail sales The price, the wholesale price, the customer demand and the expected profit of the supplier all increase, but the retailer’s expected profit will decrease. When the traditional retail channel supplier centralized decision-making, the product quality level and the duopoly retailer value-added service level And in proportion, when the mixed channel suppliers make centralized decisions, the product quality level is higher than when there is only the electronic direct sales channel but lower than the traditional retail channels, which will stimulate the potential demand of the customers and maximize the total market demand and effectively eliminate the distribution channels Double the marginal effect. Finally, through the example analysis, this paper points out the specific application of this model in practice.