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本文运用微观经济学分析工具,从理论上分析了竞争性农产品市场中,农作物产量保险对农民预期收入和利润的影响,揭示了农户特征与农业保险中广泛存在的道德风险和逆选择问题之间的关系。本文的结论是:参加保险后,农民的预期收入曲线将发生变化;过高的投保价格是道德风险发生的诱因;在相同条件下,产量低、风险大、成本曲线缺乏弹性的农民更愿意参加保险。
In this paper, using the tools of microeconomics analysis, this paper theoretically analyzed the influence of crop yield insurance on the expected income and profit of farmers in the competitive agricultural products market, revealing the relationship between farmers’ characteristics and the widespread moral hazard and adverse selection in agricultural insurance Relationship. The conclusion of this paper is that after the insurance, the expected income curve of farmers will change. Excessive insured price is the inducement of moral hazard. Under the same conditions, farmers with low yield, high risk and inelastic cost curve are more willing to participate Insurance.