证券分析师行为日益受到我国学界的重视,但较少有文献探讨分析师在信息传播中的作用。集中于个股暴跌这一视角,本文从公司高管的负面信息抑制行为入手,重点研究分析师、信息扩散与个股暴跌之间的关系。结果表明,较多的分析师跟进能够对高管的负面信息抑制行为起到约束作用,因此坏消息的快速传播能够更多地引起个股暴跌。我们还发现,较少分析师跟进的公司更容易在盈余公告公布期间出现个股暴跌,原因在于长期积累的负面信息很容易在此期间爆发。本文的结论为证券分析师在特质信息传播中的作用提供了直接证据。 The behavior of securities analysts is paid more and more attention by the scholars in our country. However, there are few studies on the role of analysts in the dissemination of information. Focus on the stock plummeted from the perspective of this article from the company executives negative information inhibition behavior to start with a focus on analysts, information proliferation and the relationship between stock plunge. The results show that more analysts follow-up can inhibit the inhibition of senior executives negative information, so the rapid spread of bad news can cause more stocks crash. We also found that companies followed by fewer analysts are more likely to experience a plunge in stocks during the earnings announcement as negative long-term accumulation of information can easily erupt during this period. The conclusion of this paper provides direct evidence for the role of securities analysts in the dissemination of trait information.