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本文从债券投资者的角度研究了超额控制权对公司债券的影响。通过研究中国2007-2013年交易所上市债券,我们发现实际控制人的超额控制权越多,债券的信用评级越低,信用利差越大。而且,实际控制人的超额控制权越多,发行人的总体债务水平越高。研究表明,实际控制人拥有超额控制权时,发行人的道德风险问题进一步恶化,从而对公司融资活动产生负面影响,公司的融资成本增加。
This paper studies the impact of excess control on corporate bonds from the perspective of bond investors. By studying China’s exchange-listed bonds from 2007 to 2013, we find that the more controlling shareholders are over-controlling, the lower the credit rating of the bonds and the greater the credit spread. Moreover, the more the actual controller’s over-control, the higher the issuer’s overall debt level. The research shows that when the actual controller owns the excess control power, the issue of moral hazard of the issuer deteriorates further, which has a negative impact on the financing activities of the company, and the financing cost of the company increases.