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建立在重复博弈模型上的逆向选择问题称为信誉理论,该理论主要研究博弈参与者如何通过树立信誉实现在非合作博弈中的合作均衡。传统的信誉理论涉及的多是个体的信誉问题,但是当个体信息无法传递时,个体信誉便无法发挥作用。此时,公众通常会对拥有相同标识的集体形成一个整体判断,与个体利益相关的是他们拥有的集体信誉。本文考察了集团内部存在不同类型个体时集体信誉维护的问题,本文称为内部逆向选择问题。我们发现,由于个体利益与集体利益的差异,导致集体信誉的激励作用要弱于传统的个体信誉的作用。此外,由于集体利益与社会利益的不一致,最终即使可以有效激励集团成员最大限度地维护集体利益,如果公众信念更新相对麻木,仍会造成经济运行无效率。
The problem of adverse selection based on the repeated game model is called reputation theory. This theory mainly studies how the game participants can achieve the cooperation equilibrium in non-cooperative game by establishing reputation. The traditional theory of credibility involves mostly individual credibility problems, but when the individual information can not be transmitted, individual credibility can not play a role. At this point, the general public will generally form a collective judgment of the same identity of the collective, and the individual interests are related to their collective credibility. This paper examines the problem of collective reputation maintenance in the presence of different types of individuals within a group, which is referred to as the problem of internal adverse selection. We find that due to the difference between individual interest and collective interest, the incentive of collective credit is weaker than that of traditional individual credit. In addition, due to the inconsistency between the collective interest and the social interest, even if the group members can be effectively motivated to maximize the collective interest, if the public belief is relatively numbness, it will still cause the economic operation to be inefficient.