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借鉴前期文献中对企业高管激励影响下会计政策选择行为的相关研究,本文利用于2012年到2014年在我国上海、深圳证券交易所上市的A股上市公司数据作为研究样本,从实证的角度分析了我国上市公司高管激励情况对企业会计政策选择的影响。本文的研究结果表明:中国上市公司高管薪酬总额越高,他们越会利用会计政策选择操纵当期利润,而薪酬排名前三的董事薪酬总额越高,他们对企业的监督越到位,从而使得公司高管由于受到董事的监督没有动力也没有能力去左右公司会计政策的选择。
Based on the previous literature, this paper uses the data of A-share listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2014 as the research sample. From the empirical point of view, Analyzes the influence of senior executives incentive of listed companies on the choice of accounting policies in China. The results of this study show that the higher the total executive compensation of listed companies in China, the more they use the accounting policy to choose to manipulate current profits. The higher the total remuneration of the top three directors, the more they supervise the enterprises, Executives are not motivated or supervised by the directors to influence the choice of corporate accounting policies.