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本文建立了一个权力框架下的制度变迁模型,把制度的持续性和变革性统一在了一个动态的均衡框架中。制度的持续性和变革性都来自于制度本身的要求。持续性是制度的本质所决定的,变革性则是制度的分配属性导致的。制度除了能够帮助制度的使用者预期交易对手或者其他经济主体的行为,同时给定了所有博弈方也包括自己的策略集合,所以制度本质上是分配性的契约。由于科斯定理中分配性的缺失和交易费用概念的模糊性,单纯地使用效率和交易费用的概念既不是必须也不能够解释制度的变迁,而且制度变迁也不是效率导向的。考虑到制度和组织激励对集体行动的约束,制度变迁的内生化并不是以集体理性是否存在为标准的,制度的内生化是通过对分析可能影响制度内容的经济权力、政治权力和社会权力在不同经济主体之间的分布,进而给出制度的形成和变迁,并以此为基础分析制度的效率。
This paper establishes a model of institutional change under the framework of power, and unifies the continuity and transformativeness of the system in a dynamic equilibrium framework. The continuity and transformativeness of the system come from the requirements of the system itself. Persistence is determined by the nature of the system, and transformativeness is caused by the distributional nature of the system. In addition to being able to help system users anticipate the behavior of counterparties or other economic agents and given that all game parties also include their own set of strategies, the system is essentially a distributive contract. Due to the lack of allotment in Coase’s theorem and the fuzziness of the concept of transaction costs, the concept of simply using efficiency and transaction costs is neither necessary nor able to explain institutional change, nor is institutional change efficiency-oriented. Considering the restriction of institutional and organizational incentives to collective action, the endogenousization of institutional change is not based on the existence of collective rationality. The endogenousization of the system is based on the analysis of the economic power, political power and social power that may affect the content of the system. The distribution of different economic subjects, and then gives the formation and change of the system, and as a basis for the analysis of the efficiency of the system.