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针对供应链上具有独立决策权的各个实体由于决策激励不一致导致供应链低效的问题,以单个风险中性的供应商与多个竞争的损失规避型零售商组成的两阶段供应链系统为背景,在收益共享契约中考察竞争和零售商的损失厌恶偏好对零售商的最优订购决策以及整个供应链协调性的影响。以博弈论为基本研究方法,证明了该供应链博弈存在惟一的对称纯策略Nash均衡,而且竞争使得零售商的总订购量上升,而损失规避则使得总订购量下降。研究还发现,传统的基于风险中性假设的供应链优化模型指出,由于需求-偷窃效应导致供应链库存过量的结论,在损失规避供应链模型中不一定成立,损失规避将消除这种效应,并且当零售商的损失规避程度很高且不考虑缺货成本时,将导致供应链系统库存不足。
Aiming at the problem of supply chain inefficiencies caused by inconsistent decision-making incentives for entities with independent decision-making power in the supply chain, the two-stage supply chain system consisting of a single risk-neutral supplier and multiple competing loss-averse retailers is the background. In the revenue-sharing contract, we examine the impact of competition and retailer’s loss aversion preferences on the retailer’s optimal ordering decisions and the overall supply chain coordination. Using game theory as the basic research method, it is proved that there is a unique symmetrical pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this supply chain game. Moreover, the competition increases the total order quantity of retailers, and loss aversion causes the total order quantity to decrease. The study also found that the traditional supply chain optimization model based on risk-neutral assumptions pointed out that due to demand-theft effects leading to excess supply chain inventory conclusions, the loss avoidance in the supply chain model is not necessarily established, loss aversion will eliminate this effect, And when the retailer’s loss aversion is very high and does not consider the cost of stockouts, it will lead to insufficient supply chain system inventory.