本文以现行金融体系为背景,从激励相容的视角构建了政府与金融机构的委托代理模型。结果显示:(1)财政的最优分担比例由政府和金融机构的风险规避系数以及税率决定的;(2)最优的风险程度取决于政府和金融机构的风险规避系数、单位方差、风险对收益的影响度以及金融机构的资本金。为控制金融风险,应采取建立存款保险制度、按最优分担比例分担金融危机、提升政府和金融机构的风险规避系数以及增加金融机构的资本金等措施。 Based on the current financial system, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of government and financial institutions from the perspective of incentive compatibility. The results show that: (1) The optimal proportion of the fiscal share is determined by the risk aversion coefficient of the government and financial institutions and the tax rate; (2) The optimal degree of risk depends on the risk aversion coefficient, unit variance and risk of the government and financial institutions The impact of earnings and the capital of financial institutions. In order to control financial risks, measures should be taken such as establishing a deposit insurance system, sharing the financial crisis according to the optimal sharing ratio, raising the risk aversion coefficient of the government and financial institutions, and increasing the capital of financial institutions.