我认为,21世纪的前半叶将是更加困难,更加令人不安,但却比我们在20世纪所知道的一切更有开放性。我这样说有三个前提,不过在这里我都来不及予以论证。第一是说,大凡历史体系,就像一切体系一样,都是生也有涯的。它们有起始,有长程发展,而最后,当它们远离平衡态而达到分岔点时,便有消亡。第二个前提是说,在这些分岔点上,有两点确实无疑:其一曰小投入有大产出(与体系的正常发展时期相反,那时是大投入有小产出);其二日这种分岔点的结局素来是不确定的。第三个前提是说,作为一个历史体系,现代世界体系业已 I think the first half of the twenty-first century will be more difficult and more disturbing but more open than everything we know in the twentieth century. I have three premises to say this, but here I can not justify it. The first is that all historical systems, just like all systems, have their own life and career. They start with a long way to go, and in the end, they die out when they reach the bifurcation point away from equilibrium. The second premise is that there are two points at these bifurcation points. There is no doubt that one of them is a small output with a large output (contrary to the normal development of the system at that time, there was a large input and a small output); The outcome of such a bifurcation on the 2nd has always been uncertain. The third prerequisite is that as a historical system, the modern world system has already been established