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运用数学建模和博弈论分析方法,研究同质Stackelberg市场中技术许可方对其专利技术质量拥有私人信息时的许可行为.模型中,许可方不再是独立的研发机构,而是作为市场中的内部创新者参与生产和竞争.在满足被许可方能接受许可的情况下,使许可方利润最大化,确定固定转让费、单位转让费以及混同合约与分离合约的最优选择.为参与主体提供理论参考,以提高技术许可效率.
Using mathematical modeling and game theory analysis, we study the licensing behavior of the technology licensors in the homogeneous Stackelberg market when they have private information on the quality of their patented technology. In the model, the licensor is no longer an independent R & D institution, Of the internal innovators involved in the production and competition to maximize the profit of the licensor to meet the licensee can accept the permit, to determine the fixed transfer fee, the unit transfer fee and the best choice of mixing contract and separation contract for the participants Provide a theoretical reference to improve the efficiency of technology licensing.