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为探究矿工习惯性违章行为(HVB)的变化路径,从演化博弈的角度,基于改进的累积前景理论(CPT),构建矿工与安全监管人员间的收益感知矩阵;在综合考虑双方利益的基础上,引入薪酬激励作为变量,构建奖酬变动对矿工HVB变化的影响模型;以王庄煤矿为例,运用Matlab仿真软件模拟验证改进措施。结果表明:以改进的CPT为基础的演化博弈能有效探究矿工HVB的变化过程;只有当4个约束不等式同时被满足时,安全程度才能达到最高;在一定条件下,薪酬激励程度越高,矿工违章行为发生概率越低。提高薪酬水平和矿工风险感知能力有利于降低矿工HBV的发生概率,提升煤矿安全管理水平。
In order to explore the change path of miner’s habitual violation behavior (HVB), from the perspective of evolutionary game, this paper builds a revenue-aware matrix between miners and safety supervisors based on the improved cumulative foreground theory (CPT). Based on the comprehensive consideration of the interests of both parties, , Introducing salary incentive as a variable to construct a model of the impact of remuneration changes on miners’ HVB changes. Taking Wangzhuang Coal Mine as an example, the simulation and verification improvement measures are simulated by Matlab. The results show that evolution game based on improved CPT can effectively explore the change process of miners’ HVB. Only when four constraint inequalities are satisfied simultaneously, the degree of safety can reach the highest level. Under certain conditions, the higher the level of salary incentive, The lower the probability of illegal behavior. Raising the remuneration level and the miners ’risk perception ability will help to reduce the probability of miners’ occurrence of HBV and improve the safety management level of coal mines.