论文部分内容阅读
证券分析师是否会为了商业性目的而牺牲专业性?文章利用融资融券制度检验了鼓励交易动机是否会导致分析师有意提供偏颇的股票分析报告。卖空交易使股票在下跌过程中也能增加交易佣金,促使证券分析师给出更加客观的盈余预测。文章采用经过股票价格调整的盈余预测误差绝对值,作为分析师盈余预测偏差的度量指标,发现相对于存在卖空限制的股票,分析师对融资融券标的股票的短期盈余预测偏差降低了约0.014,长期盈余预测偏差降低了约0.019,但平均月度换手率上升了约10.9%。公司业绩和盈余预测难度的变化不能解释这一现象。文章研究表明,鼓励交易动机会使分析师发布更加乐观的盈余预测报告,而允许卖空有助于矫正这种商业性动机,增强分析师的专业性。
Will securities analysts sacrifice their professionalism for commercial purposes? The article uses a margin trading system to examine whether encouraging trading motivations can lead analysts to provide biased stock analysis reports. Short selling can also increase trading commissions as the stock declines, prompting analysts to give more objective earnings forecasts. The article uses the absolute value of earnings forecast error adjusted by the stock price as a measure of the analyst’s earnings forecast bias and finds that the short-term earnings forecast bias of the underlying stocks of margin financing and securities lending is reduced by about 0.014 relative to the stock with short selling restrictions , Long-term earnings forecast bias decreased by about 0.019, but the average monthly turnover increased by about 10.9%. Changes in the difficulty of company performance and earnings forecast can not explain this phenomenon. Article research shows that encouraging the trading motivation will enable analysts to release more optimistic earnings forecasts, while allowing short sales can help correct this commercial motivation and enhance the professionalism of analysts.