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基于委托代理理论,文章从制度环境变迁视角对企业捐赠的动机进行了实证研究。研究发现:代理成本越高,企业捐赠规模就越大,表明企业慈善捐赠行为存在委托代理问题;而外部制度环境,如正式制度(以市场化程度来度量)、非正式制度(以信任环境来度量)的优化可以缓解企业捐赠行为中的代理问题,表明外部制度环境能发挥一定的治理作用,可以弱化企业代理成本对其捐赠规模的影响,由此缓解企业捐赠行为的代理问题。进一步研究还发现,企业的国有控股性质和传统商帮文化显著增强了企业捐赠的代理问题,但政企关联对企业捐赠的代理问题未能产生显著影响。上述结论均得到中国2008–2013年沪市A股制造业经验证据的支持。文章在为企业捐赠的代理问题提供经验证据的同时,也从制度环境变迁视角为规范和引导企业捐赠行为提供了来自宏观制度层面的参考依据,从而有利于更加全面认知整体制度环境中公司委托代理问题和捐赠行为。
Based on principal-agent theory, the article makes an empirical study on the motivation of corporate donation from the perspective of institutional environment changes. The research shows that the higher the agency cost is, the larger the scale of corporate donation is, indicating that there is a principal-agent problem in corporate charitable donations. The external institutional environment, such as the formal system (measured by the degree of marketization), the informal system Measure) can alleviate the agency problem in corporate donation behavior, indicating that the external institutional environment can play a certain governance role, which can weaken the impact of corporate agency costs on the scale of its donation, thereby alleviating the agency problem of corporate donation behavior. Further research also found that the nature of state-controlled enterprises and traditional business culture helped to significantly increase the agency of corporate donations, but the relationship between government and enterprises did not have a significant impact on the agency of corporate donations. All the above conclusions are supported by the evidence of China’s A-share manufacturing industry in 2008-2013. While providing empirical evidence for agency issues donated by enterprises, the article also provides a reference from the perspective of macro-system for standardizing and guiding corporate donations from the perspective of institutional environment changes so as to be more conducive to a more comprehensive understanding of corporate commission in the overall institutional environment Agency issues and donations.