本文首先概述了我国股票市场中“庄家”操纵股票价格行为 ,随后说明中小投资者“跟庄”以及在长期中大比例亏损的现象。本文通过建立一个二级市场中“庄家”与中小投资者的不完全信息动态博弈模型 ,试图说明在一个阶段中中小投资者根据期望效用最大化进行的决策 ,在长期内也许并不是理性的。为中小投资者“跟庄”、“追涨杀跌”以及长期亏损等现象提供一个解释。并根据模型的分析 ,简要提出了我们的建议 This article first outlines the “stock market” manipulation of stock prices in China’s stock market, followed by small and medium investors, “with the village” and a large proportion of the phenomenon of loss in the long run. In this paper, we attempt to illustrate the decision-making of medium and small investors based on expected utility maximization in a stage, which may not be rational in the long run by establishing a dynamic game model of incomplete information between “bookmakers” and small investors in the secondary market. For small and medium investors, “with the village”, “chase sell” as well as long-term losses and other phenomena provide an explanation. According to the analysis of the model, we briefly put forward our proposal