本文通过将科斯定理中权利有效率地移转有利于整个社会福利的增进这一理论应用于合同法、侵权法以及行政处罚法,以求从法律与经济学的角度分析,侵权责任与行政罚款在何种领域内运行更有效率。侵权责任以自由交易为前置途径,因此它赋予理性的施害人以选择权:首先寻求自由交易;交易成本很高而诉讼成本很低时就选择侵权行为实现权利有效率的再配置,同时承担损害成本。其中的效率问题集中体现于在互施成本的双方之间如何分配责任更有利于社会福利的增进。在论述行政罚款时,分析了两个问题:一是将行政罚款与侵权损害赔偿进行比较,得出行政罚款应该针对施害人与受害人绝无可能(是指效率上的不可能)自愿达成合意转移权利的情况;二是政府在选择以造成的损害(或可能造成的损害)为确定罚款数额的标准,还是以预防损害的成本为标准时,似乎前者更有效率。 This article applies the theory of contract law, tort law and administrative penalty law to efficiently transfer the rights in Coase Theorem and promote the promotion of social welfare as a whole, so as to analyze from law and economics, tort liability and administrative penalty In what areas run more efficiently. Tort liability takes free trade as a preemptive approach, so it gives rational bachelors the right to choose: first, to seek free trade; transaction costs are high and litigation costs are low, the right to choose infringement to re-configure the rights, at the same time Bear the cost of damage. The issue of efficiency among them is embodied in how to allocate responsibilities between the two parties for mutual benefits, which is more conducive to the promotion of social welfare. When discussing the administrative fines, two problems are analyzed: one is to compare the administrative fines with the damages of infringement, and the conclusion is that administrative fines should be voluntary for the perpetrators and the victims (implying that the efficiency is impossible) The case of the right transfer of rights; the second is that the Government seems to be more efficient in choosing whether the damage caused (or the damage it may cause) to be the standard for determining the amount of the fine or the cost of preventing damage.