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This study investigates how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards(IFRS) affects the contractual benefits of using accounting information to determine executive compensation in China. After controlling for firm and corporate governance characteristics, we find strong evidence supporting the positive role of mandatory IFRS adoption on the accounting-based performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Subsample analysis suggests that improvements in accounting-based performance sensitivity after IFRS adoption differ across regions with various levels of institutional quality and across firms that are affected to a different extent by the adoption. Additional analysis supports the argument that the positive effects of IFRS adoption on the use of accounting performance in executive compensation are driven by the reduction in accounting conservatism associated with IFRS adoption.
This study investigates how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects the contractual benefits of using with accounting information to determine executive compensation in China. After controlling for firm and corporate governance characteristics, we find strong evidence supporting the positive role of mandatory IFRS adoption on the accounting-based performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Subsample analysis that that improvements in accounting-based performance sensitivity after IFRS adoption differ across regions with various levels of institutional quality and across firms that are affected to a different extent by the adoption. Additional analysis supports the argument that the positive effects of IFRS adoption on the use of accounting performance in executive compensation are driven by the reduction in accounting conservatism associated with IFRS adoption.