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企业合并在产生巨大经济效率的同时,也便利了企业实施单方涨价抑或共谋行为。伴随着经济的发展,越来越多的合并会同时产生双重效应,此时单纯的许可/禁止合并都可能造成较高的错误成本。因此,合并救济制度为执法机关和当事人提供了一项协商缓和机制。“S-C-P”范式的发展奠定了结构性救济措施与行为性救济措施的分类基础,既有救济措施也随着经济的发展创新并变化,但仍然是围绕结构性救济措施与行为性救济措施展开的,而完美的制度设计并不一定能够解决实施问题。近年来,先行修正的安排、买家前置与皇冠宝石条款的约定以及资产分持条款的采用,此类配套保障措施使救济措施得到了有效落实,并提高了案件审查效率。基于成本效益的考量和配套保障措施的适用,结构性救济措施与行为性救济措施的选择存在一个位阶顺序:前者原则性适用,而后者只能例外适用。
While business mergers generate huge economic efficiency, they also facilitate the implementation of unilateral price increases or complicities by enterprises. With the development of economy, more and more mergers will have dual effects at the same time. Pure permission / no merge may result in higher error costs. As a result, the merger relief system provides a mechanism for negotiating mitigation for law enforcement agencies and clients. The development of “SCP” paradigm lays the foundation for the classification of structural remedies and behavioral remedies. The existing remedies also innovate and change with the development of economy, but they still focus on structural remedies and behavioral remedies Unfolded, and the perfect system design does not necessarily solve the implementation problem. In recent years, the arrangements for the first amendment, the buyer’s premise and Crown Gems terms of the agreement and the use of asset sharing provisions, such supportive measures to enable relief measures have been effectively implemented, and improve the efficiency of case review. Based on considerations of cost-effectiveness and the application of supporting safeguards, there is an order of precedence for the selection of structural remedies and behavioral remedies: the former applies in principle while the latter applies only exceptionally.