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本文以华北制药和电广传媒为例,对比分析了政府股东主导下的“以股抵债”方案及其实施对上市公司各相关利益人的影响。我们发现,虽然两个方案存在一定差异,但是由于作为控股股东的政府在制定方案时的角色定位矛盾,因以不能损及政府股东的利益为基本前提,导致两公司“以股抵债”方案均只能暂时缓解而不能根本上解决大股东欠款问题,同时却为控股股东获取控制权收益提供了机会,强化了大股东和小股东之间的代理冲突。因此,为了市场的健康发展,政府股东必须科学定位自己的角色,在监管者与被监管者之间做出一个选择,或者通过建立一个良好的法律机制对政府股东的行为加以约束和规范。
This paper takes North China Pharmaceutical and Dian Guang Media as an example to compare and analyze the influence of the “Debt-over-equity” scheme under the leadership of government shareholders and its implementation on various stakeholders in the listed companies. We find that although there are some differences between the two plans, the two companies, “debt-for-equity”, as the controlling shareholder’s role in the formulation of the program are contradictory in positioning because they can not damage the interests of the government shareholders. All the proposals can only temporarily ease and can not fundamentally solve the problem of large shareholders’ arrears. At the same time, however, they provide opportunities for controlling shareholders to gain control gains and strengthen the agency conflicts between major shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, for the healthy development of the market, the shareholders of the government must scientifically locate their own roles, make a choice between supervisors and supervisors, or restrict and regulate the behavior of government shareholders by establishing a good legal mechanism.