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本文以我国公司债为研究背景,基于代理理论分析两权分离对公司债融资成本的影响。以2007~2014年期间公开发行的公司债为样本,研究发现,两权分离对公司债融资成本的影响在统计和经济意义上都是显著的,控制公司、债券自身特征以及宏观因素影响后,两权分离程度每增加一个单位,公司债融资成本提高约0.16个百分点。进一步研究发现,审计质量、分析师关注度以及制度环境等外部治理机制通过缓解两权分离导致的代理冲突,降低了公司债融资成本。本研究从公司债的角度提供了两权分离导致代理冲突,进而增加债券融资成本的直接经验证据,丰富了理论文献并具有一定的实践意义。
This paper takes the corporate debt of our country as the research background and analyzes the influence of the separation of ownership and the corporate financing cost on the basis of agency theory. Taking the publicly issued corporate bonds from 2007 to 2014 as a sample, the study finds that the impact of the separation of ownership and the ownership on the financing costs of corporate bonds is significant in the statistical and economic sense. After controlling for the characteristics of the company and the bonds and the macroeconomic factors, For each additional unit of ownership, the cost of corporate debt financing increased by about 0.16 percentage point. Further study found that the external governance mechanisms such as audit quality, analyst attention and institutional environment reduced the financing cost of corporate bonds by alleviating the agency conflicts caused by the separation of ownership. This study provides evidence from the perspective of corporate bonds that the separation of ownership and ownership leads to agency conflicts, which in turn increases the direct experience of the financing costs of bonds, which enriches the theoretical literature and has some practical significance.