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并购的加剧强化了世界范围内的寡头垄断经济格局。本文使用古诺模型,探讨了寡头垄断市场开放中反竞争行为出现的可能和条件,及对开放国福利的影响。通过模型的演绎,可以得出以下结论:进入一个存在反竞争联盟的东道国市场对外资来说更有利;反竞争联盟制定的价格水平与该国的壁垒高低相关;在东道国贸易壁垒从高位降低的渐次有限开放过程中,最易发生国际化的反竞争联盟,此时该国的福利水平最低;只有在竞争能够保证的情况下,寡头垄断市场的开放后福利水平才会绝对提高。因此,运用竞争政策对反竞争行为进行防范和规制,是寡头垄断市场增进开放福利的必要条件。
The aggravation of mergers and acquisitions has strengthened the oligopolistic economy in the world. This paper uses the Cournot model to discuss the possible and conditions for the emergence of anti-competitive behavior in the oligopolistic market and its impact on the welfare of open countries. Through the deduction of the model, the following conclusions can be drawn: entering a host country with an anti-competitive coalition is more favorable for foreign capital; the price level set by the anti-competitive coalition is related to the level of the country’s barriers; and the trade barriers in the host country are decreasing from a high level In the process of gradual and limited opening up, the internationalized anti-competitive coalition is most prone to occur. At this time, the welfare level of the country is the lowest. Only when the competition can be guaranteed can the level of welfare in the oligopoly market rise after the liberalization be absolutely enhanced. Therefore, the use of competition policy to guard against and control anti-competitive behavior is necessary for oligopolistic market to promote open welfare.