At his first international conferences as the leader of the United States， President Joe Biden had a short but emphatic message for listening world leaders： “America is back.”
　　Speaking at the Group of Seven （G7） Summit and the subsequent Munich Security Conference in February， Biden intended to politically exorcize his predecessor Donald Trump as he looked to repair the damage Trump had caused to U.S. allies， and reinstate the U.S. into the forefront of international politics.
　　During the two virtual conferences， Biden reeled off a list of promises his new administration would adhere to， including upkeeping“unshakable” support for the transatlantic alliance and upholding multilateralism. He also announced that the U.S. had re-signed the Paris Agreement on climate change， promised to reenter multilateral nuclear talks with Iran， and even declared America’s re-entry into the World Health Organization， putting the final nail in the coffin of Trump’s disastrous America First foreign policy.
　　Then there was the added bonus of the G7 conference concluding with a full joint statement， something that had become uncertain when Trump was president， with the U.S. committing $4 billion conditionally as part of the extra$7 billion in funding pledged by G7 leaders for COVID-19 vaccine distribution.
　　Biden’s speech elicited the desired response from some attending leaders， including UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen， who expressed their “excitement” that “America was back as leader of the free world.” It seemed that Biden and his team， in their first diplomatic engagement， had on the surface succeeded in restoring the battered U.S. reputation and earned an early victory for the new administration.

Not so fast

　　Not quite. As Biden himself admitted during the conferences， “the last four years have been hard，”especially between the U.S. and its allies in Europe， allies who will not have forgotten the bruising treatment they received.
　　And while Biden’s comments and commitments buoyed many leaders， there was enough evidence at the meetings to suggest that he faces a difficult task in commanding the same vein of support from allies that administrations before Trump enjoyed.
　　German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron used the two conferences to subtly show that they would not so easily bend to the will of the new U.S. administration. 　　Merkel made a clear point of stating that German and U.S. interests“will not always converge，” while Macron claimed that while he had listened to Biden’s list of “common challenges，” Europe has“an agenda that is unique.”
　　Macron in particular appears ready to challenge many of Biden’s international ambitions， including on the role of military alliance NATO， the risks posed by Russia， with whom Macron has been seeking greater rapprochement， and the role of the West in the global COVID-19 response.
　　The latter was a bone of contention for Macron during the two meetings， who earlier proposed G7 countries commit vaccine doses rather than simply funding to developing countries， just as China and Russia have done. The U.S.， which has crossed 500，000 COVID-19-related deaths， has been reluctant to give vaccine doses away in case it negatively impacts its own vaccine rollout， and as a result， the vaccine motion was quickly dismissed.

The China topic

　　The clearest indication， however， that Biden faces an uphill struggle in pushing through his international objectives comes in the shape of the question how to seek a collaborative approach to balance against China.
　　Biden issued this message during the Munich Security Conference， stating that countries“must prepare together for long-term strategic competition with China.” But while he and his administration believe this to be a key international goal in need of attention， his allies were not so forthcoming.
　　Few commented on Biden’s assertion， with Macron preferring to talk about security problems in the Middle East， and by the end of both conferences， China was mentioned only a few times. In the G7 joint statement， published to describe the collective goals of the organization going forward， China was referred to only in favorable terms with regard to engagement， a further blow to Biden’s China plans.
　　In truth， and particularly for European nations， there currently appears little appetite to confront China， with whom the European Union has enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship in the United States’ absence. China now contributes more trade to the bloc than the U.S. while the recently agreed on Comprehensive Agreement on Investment highlights the greater integration of the two economies.
　　Other U.S. allies are also placing greater emphasis on their economic recovery in light of the COVID-19 pandemic rather than taking on China， one of the few economies to record positive GDP growth last year， and with whom they need positive relations.

　　It’s a penny that appears to have finally dropped in the UK， which experienced the biggest annual decline of its economy in 300 years as a result of the pandemic， with Johnson calling himself “fervently Sinophile” as he looks to restart economic dialogue with the Chinese business community after a yearlong freeze， and get the UK’s economy back on track.

A changed world

　　After four years in the wilderness， Biden’s assertion that the U.S. is back is positive for U.S. allies in their global efforts to conquer common challenges such as fighting climate change and bringing an end to the pandemic.
　　But the diplomatic world the U.S. has reentered is vastly different from the one it left in 2016. Allies’ trust in the U.S. has been deeply eroded after the actions of the previous administration， and countries once bitten by the U.S. are now twice shy to blindly follow its lead， especially when the benefits do not align with their own.
　　It is early days for this new U.S. administration， which is still getting to grips with the new political environment it finds itself in. But if it is truly back， then it needs to get on with the new program—a program that doesn’t always seek to promote a U.S.-led agenda. BR