就保险标的的个体信息而言,保险人一无所知,而投保人则知道自己是属于高风险或是低风险。对风险信息的高度依赖性以及信息结构的不对称性,决定了双方之间必然存在着信息博弈,这往往会导致逆向选择风险。因此,需要法律制度激励真实信息披露,以实现保险契约最优。文章主要从投保人的如实告知义务出发,研究法律对逆向选择风险的规制。 Insurers know nothing about the subject matter of the subject matter of the insured, and the insured knows that they are high risk or low risk. The high degree of dependence on risk information and the asymmetry of information structure determine the inevitable existence of information game between the two parties, which often results in adverse selection risk. Therefore, the legal system is needed to stimulate the real information disclosure in order to achieve the optimal insurance contract. The article, starting from the factual obligation of informing the insured, studies the regulation of the law on the risk of adverse selection.