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在进来对自由的能动性和“自由意志问题”的探讨中,行动者因果性理论已经作为一个主要的解决方案而凸显出来。E·J·罗伊提出的理论尤其备受关注,因为他不仅试图克服传统的行动者因果性理论所面临的困难,而且也试图发展一种非笛卡尔式的实体二元论,把它作为其行动者因果性理论的形而上学基础。在这篇文章中,我将尝试性地表明罗伊的理论为什么是内在不一致的或者至少是不稳定的,他所采取的进路为什么在某种程度上是误入歧途的。
In exploring the motivation of freedom and the “question of free will,” the theory of the causal role of actors has emerged as a major solution. The theory put forward by J.J. Roy is of particular concern because he not only tries to overcome the difficulties faced by the traditional causal theory of causation but also attempts to develop a non-Cartesian substantive dualism as its action Metaphysical foundation of causal theory. In this article I will try to show why Roy’s theory is inherently inconsistent or at least not stable, and why the path taken by him is somewhat astray.