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建立了一个两阶段研发(R&D)竞赛模型,分析在累积性创新市场上厂商选择不同知识产权保护策略对其创新决策及最优政策的影响。研究表明:当商业秘密能够作为创新的有效保护机制时,政府应该对初始创新实行宽专利保护政策,以刺激创新信息的披露;如果此时专利政策仍不能奏效,那么政府就应该实行宽松的反垄断政策,允许初始创新者和后续创新者达成同盟协议。
Established a two-phase R & D contest model to analyze the influence of different IPR protection strategies on the innovation decision and the optimal policy in the Cumulative Innovation Market. The research shows that when commercial secrets can serve as an effective protection mechanism for innovation, the government should implement a broad patent protection policy for initial innovation so as to stimulate the disclosure of innovative information. If the patent policy still fails to be effective at this time, the government should implement lenient anti- Monopoly policy, allowing initial innovators and follow-up innovators to reach a league agreement.