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麦克道尔站在当代知识论的立场上对康德哲学进行了解读。在他看来,康德正确地提出了关于客观世界的知识是来自于接受性与自发性、感性与知性相结合的看法,从而成为摆脱在所予论与融贯论之间摇摆的可能出路。但令麦克道尔不满意的是,康德把对经验问题的论述嵌入到先验框架内,这个先验框架预设了超感觉的实在和先验主体的存在,致使康德未能把他的经验理论贯彻到底,最终陷入了所予论。为此,麦克道尔力图用第二自然的自然主义来取代康德的先验视角,以期对经验与概念的关系做出一种融贯的说明,进而解决近代哲学遗留下来的心灵与世界的关系问题。但本文力图表明由于麦克道尔对康德先验视角的根本性误读,使得他最终未能应对康德的先验问题。
Kant’s philosophy was interpreted by McDowell from the standpoint of contemporary epistemology. In his view, Kant rightly proposed that knowledge of the objective world came from a combination of receptivity and spontaneity, sensibility and intellectuality, and thus became the possible way out of the swing between the theory of argument and the theory of coherence. But what makes McDowell dissatisfied is that Kant embeds the discourse of experience problems in the transcendental framework, which presupposes the existence of transcendental realities and transcendental agents, which renders Kant unable to translate his experience The theory is implemented in the end, eventually caught in the theory. To this end, McDougall attempts to replace Kant’s transcendental perspective with the second natural naturalism in order to make a coherent explanation of the relationship between experience and concept, and then to solve the relationship between the mind and the world left by modern philosophy problem. However, this article attempts to show that due to the fundamental misreading of Kant’s transcendental perspectives by McDowell, he eventually failed to respond to Kant’s transcendental problems.