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约翰·格雷坚持一种价值多元的自由主义,而反对正统自由主义普遍的、理性的共识。他认为:当今社会,伦理学只能是价值多元主义视角下的一种探询,其不可通约性只会消除对于理性的误解而不会颠覆理性,在不可通约的价值观念的冲突中,那些不相容的选择都可以是正确的;在多元主义背景下,没有普遍价值标准的政治合法性目标,且满足人们愿望的政权形式也可以有多种,权利的存在形态也随历史的变化而改变,并与利益的改变相互影响。格雷提出以“权宜之计”来解决权利与价值的冲突问题。“权宜之计”放弃对一种普遍政权的规划,并很好地适应了各种在现在和将来都包含多种生活方式的社会;但理论上的极端性和现实中的局限性,使其并不能真正成为一种普世伦理,也不能从根本上解决权利与价值的冲突。
John Gray adheres to a pluralistic liberalism that opposes the universal and rational consensus of orthodox liberalism. In his opinion, in today’s society, ethics can only be a kind of inquiry under the perspective of value pluralism. Its incommensurability only eliminates the misunderstanding of rationality without subverting rationality. In the conflict of incommensurable values, Those incompatible choices can be correct; in the context of pluralism, there is no goal of political legitimacy of universal values, and there are many forms of regimes that satisfy people’s wishes. The existing forms of rights also change with history And change, and changes in interest affect each other. Gray proposed using “expediency ” to solve the conflict between rights and values. “Expediency ” Abandoning the planning of a universal regime and well adapted to all kinds of societies that now and in the future contain multiple ways of life; but theoretical extremes and realities of limitations, So that it can not really become a universal ethics, nor can it fundamentally solve the conflict between rights and values.