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“集体行使监督职权”是《监督法》贯彻的基本原则之一。这一原则的确认是以“多数决”、“集体负责”等政治理论作为解释学基础的。从法律方法论出发,这一原则无法完全适应监督权的内在构成、人大代表的法律地位以及权力行使的法律实践等问题。通过论证“集体行使监督职权”原则在法学方法论上的缺陷,可以为重新考量这一原则提供理论上的借鉴。
“Collective exercise of supervision authority ” is one of the basic principles of the “Supervision Law”. The confirmation of this principle is based on the hermeneutics of political theory such as “majority decision ” and “collective responsibility ”. Starting from the legal methodology, this principle can not fully meet the inherent constitution of supervisory power, the legal status of NPC deputies and the legal practice of the exercise of power and other issues. By demonstrating the flaws in jurisprudence methodology of the principle of “collective exercise of oversight authority”, we can provide a theoretical reference for reconsidering this principle.