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In late June， Iraqi forces recaptured the city of Falluja from the so-called Islamic State group （ISIS） in a significant victory in the war on extremism. While the nation strives to overcome radical militants on the battlefield， it must at the same time resolve internal political deadlock.
Protests against Iraqi leaders have been mounting in recent months， as participants demand that the government fulfill its promises to reform and curb corruption.
As early as this February， Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Jawaad al-Abadi proposed a cabinet reshuffle in a bid to increase independent technocrats and put an end to the provisional political system that allocates parliamentary seats on the basis of ethnic identity and religious faction， which has been in place since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
By the end of March， Abadi had proposed a new cabinet line-up to parliament， but only a partial cabinet reshuffle was approved. Owing to partisan disputes， Abadi’s reforms cannot be fully implemented， leading to a public loss of patience underlined by the protests and marches of discontent.
On April 30， thousands of people entered Baghdad’s Green Zone， also known as the International Zone， and some even occupied the parliament building， disabling the legislative body and forcing the government to declare a state of emergency. Controlling the political volatility in Iraq since the toppling of Saddam Hussein by the United States in 2003 has proved hazardous.
As a matter of fact， Abadi has made some progress since replacing former leader Nouri al-Maliki in September 2014. Kurdish separation and the Sunni rebellion have been subdued， while ground has been gained in the fight against ISIS. These achievements indicate Abadi’s cabinet is on the right track， but the suspension of political reform and the ensuing public protest has left many disappointed. How have the proposed reforms led to this crisis？ The reasons are complex.
Social and economic problems
Public discontent has been fueled by various factors， including a lack of improvement in people’s livelihoods. Abadi’s cabinet has given priority to ensuring state security owing to the imminent threat from ISIS. In the last two years， the government has invested most of its efforts into strengthening its military force in order to counter the terrorist group. Against such a backdrop， economic development and prosperity is understandably regarded as a lesser objective. If and when the ISIS threat is stifled， Iraqis will expect the government to improve public services as soon as possible. Several large protests were triggered last year when the government failed to address power shortages or accelerate reconstruction， leading many to conclude that the government remains inefficient and unable to solve any of Iraq’s major problems other than the need to build up its military.
Floundering global oil prices have severely hampered the government’s economic strength， since as much as 90 percent of the country’s fiscal revenue derives from oil exports. In the 2015 fiscal year， the Iraqi Government’s budget deficit exceeded $20 billion， while the 2016 deficit is set to reach another record high. Juggling the onerous tasks of fighting ISIS， improving people’s livelihoods and running the government is a challenge made worse by declining global oil prices.
Due to its weak position， the government is struggling to cope with the ballooning deficit. Abadi’s cabinet planned to borrow money through domestic and international bond issuance as well as applying to the International Monetary Fund （IMF） for financial aid. However， investors are not willing to take such a gamble due to Iraq’s current instability， and the IMF’s loan conditions are harsher than what the government is willing to accept. Consequently， Abadi lacks sufficient funding to solve his country’s multitude of problems.
Abadi has needed to suspend his governmental reform because of the strong opposition that has embarrassed his government. Along with the failure to implement economic reform， political reform is also proving to be a daunting obstacle.
Political strife
In 2015， Abadi proposed a reform aiming to cut redundant government staff， curb corruption and remove senior ministers appointed because of their sect or ethnicity. However， many of his reform attempts have been stymied by other politicians， who are more interested in maintaining the status quo and hanging onto their own power and influence.
Despite Abadi’s compromises in the cabinet reshuffle， his plan cannot gain parliamentary approval. He has failed to garner support from the Sunnis and Kurds. On the flip side， the Shiites， to which Abadi belongs， accuse him of making too many concessions to the Sunnis and Kurds. These major factions perceive the cabinet reshuffle as an attempt by the prime minister to concentrate power. Thus， Abadi is caught between pushing ahead with reform， which will further antagonize his opponents， or backing down and disappointing advocates of the reform. Under such circumstances， the power struggle among political groups in Iraq has intensified. In the short run， a compromise may prove elusive. Currently， the State of Law Coalition， a Shia bloc led by former Prime Minister Maliki， is the biggest government challenger. Maliki agrees to a cabinet reshuffle but also wishes to consolidate his position through political force. Maliki appears to be waiting to seize an opportunity to replace Abadi.
Another major political power is the Iraqi National List， a secular political coalition consisting of moderate Shiites and Sunnis， led by former Vice President Ayad Allawi. Political forces representing Sunnis and Kurds also agree on a reshuffle， yet， like Maliki and Allawi， they also insist on retaining their positions within the cabinet.
The Iraqi National Alliance led by radical Shiite clerk Moqtada Sadr has repeatedly demanded a comprehensive cabinet reshuffle to negate Maliki’s influence. The division between political forces has become too wide to reconcile， thus they are unable to reach a consensus on rebalancing power， leading to the continuation of the crisis.
In Iraq， numerous tribes and minorities have historically been excluded from governance. This political and economic marginalization drives them to resort to alternative tactics to express their voices， as radical Shiite militias play an increasingly prominent role in various protests against the government.
ISIS launched a mighty offensive in 2014， resulting in their occupation of large swathes of north and west Iraq， including the country’s second largest city， Mosul. The nation was nearly torn apart by ISIS， though with international support and help from Shiite militias and Kurdish fighters， Iraqi forces have made some progress in retaking control of some territory. However， ISIS has conducted multiple terrorist attacks that have fractured security and inflamed sectarian conflicts.
Foreign interference
The Iraqi political crisis has caused concern in the United States. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry have paid visits to Baghdad， trying to harmonize rela- tions between the political factions and urging them to focus on the fight against ISIS.
Meanwhile， Iran appears to be playing an active role in the situation， as it tries to use its clout as a Shiite power to influence Iraqi politics with the aim of curbing the growing conflict between Shiite factions.
However， foreign forces have vested interests when participating in resolving Iraq’s political deadlock. Their involvement is likely to add new uncertainties to Iraqi politics.
Putting an end to the current political stalemate is not going to happen any time soon. In 2003， having overthrown Saddam Hussein， the Bush administration vowed to rebuild Iraq as a model for Middle Eastern democracy. However， 13 years later， Iraq remains far from reaching a national consensus， creating a civil society or establishing a sound and robust judicial system. The country is still reliant on foreign assistance and has a long way to go before these issues can be resolved.
Protests against Iraqi leaders have been mounting in recent months， as participants demand that the government fulfill its promises to reform and curb corruption.
As early as this February， Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Jawaad al-Abadi proposed a cabinet reshuffle in a bid to increase independent technocrats and put an end to the provisional political system that allocates parliamentary seats on the basis of ethnic identity and religious faction， which has been in place since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
By the end of March， Abadi had proposed a new cabinet line-up to parliament， but only a partial cabinet reshuffle was approved. Owing to partisan disputes， Abadi’s reforms cannot be fully implemented， leading to a public loss of patience underlined by the protests and marches of discontent.
On April 30， thousands of people entered Baghdad’s Green Zone， also known as the International Zone， and some even occupied the parliament building， disabling the legislative body and forcing the government to declare a state of emergency. Controlling the political volatility in Iraq since the toppling of Saddam Hussein by the United States in 2003 has proved hazardous.
As a matter of fact， Abadi has made some progress since replacing former leader Nouri al-Maliki in September 2014. Kurdish separation and the Sunni rebellion have been subdued， while ground has been gained in the fight against ISIS. These achievements indicate Abadi’s cabinet is on the right track， but the suspension of political reform and the ensuing public protest has left many disappointed. How have the proposed reforms led to this crisis？ The reasons are complex.
Social and economic problems
Public discontent has been fueled by various factors， including a lack of improvement in people’s livelihoods. Abadi’s cabinet has given priority to ensuring state security owing to the imminent threat from ISIS. In the last two years， the government has invested most of its efforts into strengthening its military force in order to counter the terrorist group. Against such a backdrop， economic development and prosperity is understandably regarded as a lesser objective. If and when the ISIS threat is stifled， Iraqis will expect the government to improve public services as soon as possible. Several large protests were triggered last year when the government failed to address power shortages or accelerate reconstruction， leading many to conclude that the government remains inefficient and unable to solve any of Iraq’s major problems other than the need to build up its military.
Floundering global oil prices have severely hampered the government’s economic strength， since as much as 90 percent of the country’s fiscal revenue derives from oil exports. In the 2015 fiscal year， the Iraqi Government’s budget deficit exceeded $20 billion， while the 2016 deficit is set to reach another record high. Juggling the onerous tasks of fighting ISIS， improving people’s livelihoods and running the government is a challenge made worse by declining global oil prices.
Due to its weak position， the government is struggling to cope with the ballooning deficit. Abadi’s cabinet planned to borrow money through domestic and international bond issuance as well as applying to the International Monetary Fund （IMF） for financial aid. However， investors are not willing to take such a gamble due to Iraq’s current instability， and the IMF’s loan conditions are harsher than what the government is willing to accept. Consequently， Abadi lacks sufficient funding to solve his country’s multitude of problems.
Abadi has needed to suspend his governmental reform because of the strong opposition that has embarrassed his government. Along with the failure to implement economic reform， political reform is also proving to be a daunting obstacle.
Political strife
In 2015， Abadi proposed a reform aiming to cut redundant government staff， curb corruption and remove senior ministers appointed because of their sect or ethnicity. However， many of his reform attempts have been stymied by other politicians， who are more interested in maintaining the status quo and hanging onto their own power and influence.
Despite Abadi’s compromises in the cabinet reshuffle， his plan cannot gain parliamentary approval. He has failed to garner support from the Sunnis and Kurds. On the flip side， the Shiites， to which Abadi belongs， accuse him of making too many concessions to the Sunnis and Kurds. These major factions perceive the cabinet reshuffle as an attempt by the prime minister to concentrate power. Thus， Abadi is caught between pushing ahead with reform， which will further antagonize his opponents， or backing down and disappointing advocates of the reform. Under such circumstances， the power struggle among political groups in Iraq has intensified. In the short run， a compromise may prove elusive. Currently， the State of Law Coalition， a Shia bloc led by former Prime Minister Maliki， is the biggest government challenger. Maliki agrees to a cabinet reshuffle but also wishes to consolidate his position through political force. Maliki appears to be waiting to seize an opportunity to replace Abadi.
Another major political power is the Iraqi National List， a secular political coalition consisting of moderate Shiites and Sunnis， led by former Vice President Ayad Allawi. Political forces representing Sunnis and Kurds also agree on a reshuffle， yet， like Maliki and Allawi， they also insist on retaining their positions within the cabinet.
The Iraqi National Alliance led by radical Shiite clerk Moqtada Sadr has repeatedly demanded a comprehensive cabinet reshuffle to negate Maliki’s influence. The division between political forces has become too wide to reconcile， thus they are unable to reach a consensus on rebalancing power， leading to the continuation of the crisis.
In Iraq， numerous tribes and minorities have historically been excluded from governance. This political and economic marginalization drives them to resort to alternative tactics to express their voices， as radical Shiite militias play an increasingly prominent role in various protests against the government.
ISIS launched a mighty offensive in 2014， resulting in their occupation of large swathes of north and west Iraq， including the country’s second largest city， Mosul. The nation was nearly torn apart by ISIS， though with international support and help from Shiite militias and Kurdish fighters， Iraqi forces have made some progress in retaking control of some territory. However， ISIS has conducted multiple terrorist attacks that have fractured security and inflamed sectarian conflicts.
Foreign interference
The Iraqi political crisis has caused concern in the United States. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry have paid visits to Baghdad， trying to harmonize rela- tions between the political factions and urging them to focus on the fight against ISIS.
Meanwhile， Iran appears to be playing an active role in the situation， as it tries to use its clout as a Shiite power to influence Iraqi politics with the aim of curbing the growing conflict between Shiite factions.
However， foreign forces have vested interests when participating in resolving Iraq’s political deadlock. Their involvement is likely to add new uncertainties to Iraqi politics.
Putting an end to the current political stalemate is not going to happen any time soon. In 2003， having overthrown Saddam Hussein， the Bush administration vowed to rebuild Iraq as a model for Middle Eastern democracy. However， 13 years later， Iraq remains far from reaching a national consensus， creating a civil society or establishing a sound and robust judicial system. The country is still reliant on foreign assistance and has a long way to go before these issues can be resolved.