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中国企业原创技术的匮乏与政府R&D补贴的强度的不断加大形成鲜明对比,通过对企业与政策制定者之间不对称信息博弈的分析,结论表明:当政策制定者拥有关于企业创新类型的真实信息时,R&D补贴的提高能有效激励企业增加自主创新投入,而当两者之间存在不对称信息,且用于自主创新的要素投入价格足够低廉时,自主创新补贴的提高将刺激企业加大模仿创新强度。
The lack of original technology of Chinese enterprises is in stark contrast to the increasing intensity of government R & D subsidies. Through the analysis of the asymmetric information game between enterprises and policymakers, the conclusion shows that when policymakers have the truth about the types of enterprise innovation Information, the R & D subsidies increase can effectively encourage enterprises to increase independent innovation investment, and when there is asymmetric information between the two, and the elements for independent innovation input prices low enough, the increase of independent innovation subsidies will stimulate enterprises to increase Imitate the intensity of innovation.