管理层的自利机会主义行为会导致股权激励的滥用和失效。本文以2006—2011年按照《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》,由董事会授予股票或期权的152家上市公司为样本,从应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余操纵两方面研究股权激励披露日、行权日和出售日前股权激励水平、激励方式对公司盈余管理行为的影响。在控制影响盈余管理动机和程度的其他因素后,本文发现披露日以及行权日之前管理层通过可操纵性应计利润进行了降低盈余的管理,激励所获股权出售日前则主要进行了调高盈余的真实活动盈余操纵;并且国有控股上市公司采用股票期权激励方式与盈余管理程度正相关,激励水平与盈余管理程度正相关。研究结果表明,后股权分置时代股权激励契约会引发管理层自利的盈余操纵行为,管理层会在应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余操纵中相机选择风险最小的盈余管理方式;股票期权并非是当前市场环境下最优的股权激励方式;股权分置改革后,大股东通过真实活动的“隧道行为”减弱,但对应计项目盈余管理并未起到抑制作用;董事会和监事会治理机制也未发挥抑制股权激励引发盈余管理的监督作用。 Management’s self-interested opportunistic behavior can lead to abuse and invalidation of equity incentives. This paper uses the 152 listed companies granted by the board of directors as stocks for 2006-2011 in accordance with the “Measures for the Management of Stock Incentives for Listed Companies (Trial)”, and studies equity incentive disclosure from accrued project earnings management and real operating surplus manipulation. The impact of equity incentives and incentives on the earnings management behavior of the company on the day of the exercise date and prior to the sale date. After controlling for other factors affecting the motivation and degree of earnings management, this paper finds that before the disclosure day and the exercise date, the management conducted the management of reduced earnings through manageable accruals, and incentives for the sale of the acquired shares were mainly adjusted before the sale date. Surplus surplus of real activity manipulation; and state-controlled listed companies adopt stock option incentives and earnings management levels are positively correlated, and incentive levels are positively correlated with earnings management. The research results show that the equity incentive contract in the post-equity division era will trigger profit management behavior of management self-interest. The management will choose the least risky earnings management method in accrued project earnings management and real activity surplus manipulation; the stock option is not It is the optimal equity incentive method under the current market environment; after the share structure reform, the major shareholders weakened through the “tunnel behavior” of real activities, but the countermeasures of the corresponding project earnings management did not play a negative role; the governance mechanism of the board of directors and the supervisory committee It also failed to play a role in the supervision of earnings management by inhibiting equity incentives.