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传统科学哲学中规则系统式定律观与普遍必然式定律观,分别代表了定律形而上学观点的最弱与最强的两端,而休谟式随附可以被看作处于这两端之间。这三者构成的定律形而上学谱系,都首先需要承诺对象及其属性的本体论优先性。可是,这时这一谱系的内部区间划分其实并不清楚。于是,对这三种观点尤其是休谟式随附与普遍必然式定律观的哲学分析就是必要的,并且有可能在结合对实际的科学定律案例的分析后获得一种超出了已有形而上学观念的定律观。
The rules of systematic law and the law of universal inevitability in the traditional philosophy of science represent the weakest and strongest ends of the metaphysical perspective of law, and the Humean-style attachment can be seen as being between these two ends. The laws of the metaphysical pedigree formed by these three are all the first to require the ontological priority of the commitment object and its attributes. However, the internal division of this pedigree is not clear at this time. Thus, a philosophical analysis of these three perspectives, especially the Humean attachment and the general law of inevitability, is necessary, and it is possible to obtain a philosophical analysis that goes beyond the metaphysical notion of existing metaphysics by combining the analysis of practical scientific law cases The concept of law.