证券民事诉讼制度是公司治理的重要组成部分,在事后保护投资者的合法权益。由于高昂的参与成本,因欺诈行为而遭受损失的投资者缺乏提起证券民事诉讼的激励。对证券虚假陈述责任纠纷判决文书的实证分析显示,投资者和证券律师之间存在显著的代理成本,证券律师为了鼓励投资者参与诉讼,倾向于高估损害赔偿。由于案件受理费是按照诉讼请求的金额计算,而不是法院判决的金额计算,投资者承担了高估损害赔偿的成本。笔者认为,可以通过改革证券民事诉讼案件受理费用的计算规则,即以判决损害赔偿的数额按比例分段累计计算受理费用,或者按照请求损害赔偿的金额累计计算,但设定受理费占判决赔偿金额的比例上限降低代理成本、提高投资者的预期收益。 Securities civil litigation system is an important part of corporate governance and protects the legitimate rights and interests of investors afterwards. Due to the high cost of participation, investors who suffered losses as a result of fraudulent activities lack incentives to file securities and civil litigation. The empirical analysis of the judgment instruments of disputes over the liability of false statements shows that there is a significant agency cost between investors and securities lawyers. Securities lawyers tend to overestimate damages in order to encourage investors to participate in litigation. As the case admissibility fee is calculated according to the amount requested by the lawsuit instead of the court judgment, the investor assumes the cost of overestimating the damages. The author believes that by calculating the rules for accepting fees in the course of reform of securities and civil lawsuits, that is, the amount of judgment damages may be calculated in stages according to the proportion of cumulative claims or the amount of compensation for damages may be calculated cumulatively. However, The upper limit of the amount reduces agency costs and increases the expected return on investors.