论文部分内容阅读
“锦标赛”式的政绩考核制背景下的地方政府和银行间的“政银合谋”是地方政府性债务急剧扩张的制度性根源。根据“政银合谋”的模型分析可知,合谋收益系数与地方政府和中央政府的监管强度均成反比,地方政府监管当地经济发展的强度系数与地方政府的融资比例和投资量均成反比,合谋收益系数与地方政府的融资比例和投资量均成正比。同时,财政部、中国人民银行、银监会提出的“采用定向承销方式发行地方政府债券”的置换方案,有利于阻断“政银合谋”机制,化解出现地方政府债务风险引发的系统性金融风险。
“Championship ” type of performance appraisal system under the background of local government and inter-bank “political silver collusion ” is the institutional root cause of the rapid expansion of local government debt. According to the analysis of the model of “political silver collusion”, the collusion gain coefficient is inversely proportional to the supervisory strength of local government and central government. The strength coefficient of local government supervising local economic development is inversely proportional to the financing ratio and investment volume of local government , Collusion income coefficient and the local government financing ratio and investment volume are directly proportional to. At the same time, the “replacement of local government bonds by directional underwriting” proposed by the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission will help stop the system of “political syndication” and resolve the system triggered by local government debt risks Sexual financial risk.