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在包含两供应商和一制造商的供应链系统中,两供应商基于横向进行合作研发,制造商为激励两供应商而对它们进行合作补贴。考虑到在供应链研发中不同合作情况,把它们的合作分为完全不合作,半合作及完全合作三种情形,并建立了相应的研发合作动态博弈模型,接着采用逆向归纳法分析两供应商的研发绩效水平、制造商产量、中间产品价格、制造商对两供应商的研发补贴率、及三种情形下供应链总利润。结果表明,供应链中两供应商的最优研发绩效水平、制造商的最优产量、供应链系统总利润及各企业利润均是在完全合作下最大,半合作下次之,完全不合作下最小;半合作下的中间产品价格小于完全不合作下的中间产品价格;半合作下制造商对两供应商的研发补贴大于完全不合作下的研发补贴。
In a supply chain system consisting of two suppliers and one manufacturer, the two suppliers cooperate on a horizontal basis and the manufacturer subsidizes both suppliers in order to motivate the two suppliers. Taking into account the different cooperation situations in the R & D of the supply chain, the cooperation is divided into three cases of total non-cooperation, semi-cooperation and complete cooperation, and the corresponding dynamic game model of R & D cooperation is established. Then the two suppliers R & D performance levels, manufacturer output, intermediate product prices, manufacturers’ R & D subsidy rates for both suppliers, and total supply chain profit in three scenarios. The results show that the optimal R & D performance of two suppliers in the supply chain, the optimal output of manufacturers, the total profit of the supply chain system and the profits of all enterprises are the largest under full cooperation, the next under semi-cooperation and the total non-cooperation The price of intermediate products under semi-cooperation is less than the price of intermediate products under total non-cooperation; and the subsidy of R & D to two suppliers under semi-cooperation is larger than the R & D subsidy under total non-cooperation.