本文在深入剖析了国有企业改革所追求的＂政企分开＂目标及其理论基础＂两权分离＂的失误后，指出：造成国有企业长期低效率的本源性因素并不在于政企不分，也不在于产权模糊，而在于公有产权约束链条的中断和国有经济的规模过大。为此，作者提出，国有资本应当退出竞争性领域，以缩小国有经济规模，提高国有经济的运行效率。但国有资本＂退出＂的速度必须同非国有资本的＂进入＂速度保持一致，同社会补偿功能的形成保持一致，以免引起社会震荡。 After deep analysis of the “separation of government and enterprise” goals and the theoretical basis of “separation of powers” from the pursuit of state-owned enterprise reform, this article points out that the source of the long-term inefficiency of state-owned enterprises is not that the government and the enterprise are indifferent. Nor is it because of the ambiguity of property rights, but the interruption of the chain of restriction of public property rights and the excessive size of the state-owned economy. To this end, the author proposes that state-owned capital should withdraw from the competitive field in order to reduce the scale of the state-owned economy and improve the operating efficiency of the state-owned economy. However, the speed with which state-owned capital “withdraws” must be consistent with the “entry” speed of non-state-owned capital, consistent with the formation of social compensation functions so as to avoid social shocks.