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考虑政府的三种决策目标,研究了逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制设计问题。分别建立了有无奖惩机制下的逆向供应链博弈模型,得到了政府奖惩力度的均衡解,并对求解结果进行比较,讨论了管理意义,最后通过算例验证了模型的结论并进一步仿真分析了外生变量对决策变量影响。研究表明:政府奖惩机制不仅能够提高废旧电器电子产品的回收率,还能降低新产品零售价,提高回购价,有利于全社会福利的提高;奖惩力度随着市场容量的增加而提高,政府应根据制造商产品的市场容量大小制定奖惩力度而不是对所有制造商制定统一的奖惩力度;政府应综合考虑全社会福利和废旧产品回收带来的环境效益,这样能较好地提高逆向供应链的回收率。
Considering the three goals of the government, this paper studies the design of government reward and punishment mechanism in the reverse supply chain. The paper establishes the game model of reverse supply chain with and without rewards and punishments separately and obtains the equilibrium solution of the government rewards and punishments, compares the solution results, discusses the significance of management, and finally verifies the conclusion of the model through an example and further simulates Influence of exogenous variables on decision variables. The results show that government rewards and punishments can not only increase the recovery rate of waste electrical and electronic products, but also reduce the retail price of new products and increase the repurchase price, which is beneficial to the improvement of social welfare. The rewards and penalties increase with the increase of market capacity. Should be based on the size of the manufacturer’s product market capacity to develop rewards and punishments rather than all manufacturers to develop a unified rewards and punishments; the government should take into account the social welfare and recycling of waste products bring environmental benefits, which can better improve the reverse supply chain The recovery rate.