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近年来 ,在中国境内 ,跨国纳税人从事国际逃税、国际避税活动屡见不鲜 ,出口骗税十分猖獗。阿林汉姆 -桑德姆预期效用最大模型、本杰米尼 -梅塔尔逃税决策相互依赖模型等理论对此不能作出恰当的解释。本文首次揭示了国际洗税行为 ,并发现上述跨国纳税人纳税不服从行为与国际洗税密切相关。本文还通过建立一个博弈模型对国际洗税内在动机进行了剖析 ,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。
In recent years, multinational taxpayers engaged in international tax evasion and international tax avoidance activities are not uncommon in China. Export tax fraud is rampant. The theoretical model of Arlingham-Somme’s expected utility maximum model, Benjamin-Metar’s tax-evolving decision-making model can not be properly explained. This article first reveals the international tax-washing behavior and finds that the above-mentioned non-compliance with taxpayers’ taxpayments is closely related to international tax-flushing. The article also analyzes the intrinsic motivation of international tax bribery by establishing a game model, and on this basis, puts forward policy suggestions.