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发生在解放战争末期的福建金门岛战斗 ,是中国人民解放军战史上罕见的一次全军覆没的失利之战。该役失利的主要原因 ,过去早有定论 :是由解放军尤其是高级指挥员在战略追击的顺利形势下产生的“轻敌思想与急躁情绪”所致。但近 40年之后 ,重要当事人肖锋将军却提出一个新的“说法” :当年三野副司令员粟裕对金门战斗有过一个“三不打”的指示 ,而十兵团领导人违背了粟的指示 ,这才是金门失利的真正原因。这一说法曾广为流布 ,传为事实 ;虽然缺乏文献支持 ,却又难于否定。但是考证三野、十兵团、2 8军这三级相关单位的档案文献和当事人的口述史料 ,并进行实践可行性分析判断 ,都应得出否定的结论 ,并且《肖锋日记》存在明显的事后修改痕迹 ,由此引申出当事人应如何为后人留下真实的史料以及研究者应如何考证、辨别、使用史料这两个史料学问题。
The battle of Kinmen Island, Fujian Province, which took place at the end of the Liberation War, was a rare battle of defeat lost by the Chinese army in the history of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The main reason for the defeat of the service was that the past has long been a conclusion: It was caused by the “light-hearted thinking and the impatience” of the PLA, especially the top commanders, under the strategic pursuit of a smooth situation. However, nearly 40 years later, General Xiao Feng, the important party, proposed a new “statement.” In the same year, Su Yu, deputy commander of San Yeh, had a “three noes” directive on the battle of Kinmen. The leaders of the 10 Corps, however, violated the directives This is the real reason for the defeat of Kinmen. This statement has been widely circulated and passed down as a fact; although it lacks documentation support, it is hard to deny it. However, textual research on archives and literature of the three related units such as San Ye, Shi Bing Tuan and 28 Jun and parties’ oral historical materials and practical feasibility analysis should lead to negative conclusions and there is a clear post-event in Di Feng Diary Therefore, it is necessary to explain how the parties should leave real historical materials for future generations and how the researchers should research, discern and use the historical materials.