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以我国民营上市公司为研究对象,揭示了政治关联对债务期限和投资效率关系的影响,运用GMM估计结果发现:短期债务提高了债权人的监督能力,有利于抑制过度投资,然而却不利于缓解投资不足;政治关联降低了短期债务对过度投资的抑制作用,但缓解了短期债务对投资不足的不利影响;政治关联类型存在效应差异,“官员型”政治关联的实权效应影响程度较高,而“代表型”和“委员型”政治关联主要谋取公平竞争机会,影响程度相对较弱。研究结论为公司制定债务期限决策、厘清政企关系以及改善信贷机制等提供了启示建议。
Taking the private listed companies of our country as the research object, this paper reveals the influence of political connection on the relationship between debt maturity and investment efficiency. Using GMM estimation results, it is found that short-term debt improves the ability of the creditor to supervise, helps to restrain overinvestment, Political connection reduces the negative effect of short-term debt on overinvestment, the effect of short-term debt on overinvestment is different, the influence of real power effect of “official type” political relation is higher, The “representative” and “committee” political affair mainly seek fair competition, the impact is relatively weak. The conclusion of the study provides suggestions for the company to make decisions on debt maturity, clarify the relationship between government and enterprises, and improve the credit mechanism.