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根据规制俘获理论的发展脉络,政府规制俘获问题的产生很大程度上是由于在信息不对称的条件下,基于委托-代理关系的规制机构与被规制企业双方追求各自利益最大化的结果。一定程度上也可以认为,这是政府规制者与企业之间达成的显性或者隐性的利益同盟,彼此之间相互勾结共同瓜分公共财产的现象。本文首先结合传统规制理论和新规制理论的相关论点,对规制俘获问题产生的原因做了简要的回顾,随后重点对规制俘获过程中规制者与被规制者双方的行为取向问题进行了详细的阐释,最后对矫正政府规制俘获问题提供了一些对策和建议。
According to the development of regulatory capture theory, the problem of capture of government regulation arises largely from the result of maximizing the interests of both regulatory agencies and regulated companies based on the principal-agent relationship under the conditions of information asymmetry. To a certain extent, this can also be considered as a dominant or recessive interest alliance concluded between the government regulator and the enterprise, which is in collusion with each other to share the common property. Based on the related arguments of the traditional regulation theory and the new regulation theory, this paper briefly reviews the reasons for the regulation of the capture problem, and then elaborates on the behavior orientation of both the regulator and the regulated one in the process of regulation capture Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to correct the capture of government regulations.