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商业银行的利润主要来源于信贷,这一点在中国银行业尤为突出,而由于信贷业务自身特点所决定,信贷业务所包含的借贷双方之间信息不对称以及由此产生的道德风险成为银行信贷业务的一个致命点。为了缓解信息不对称问题,在信贷环节中引入纳什均衡模型,结果表明,企业提供抵押、寻找担保以及加强其违约的惩罚力度有利于缓解信贷过程中的道德风险。
The profits of commercial banks mainly come from credit, which is especially prominent in Chinese banking industry. Due to the characteristics of credit business, the information asymmetry between borrowers and creditors involved in credit business and the resulting moral hazard become bank credit business A deadly point. In order to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, Nash equilibrium model was introduced in the credit process. The results show that the enterprises to provide mortgage, find the guarantee and strengthen the punishment of breach of contract will help to ease the moral hazard in the credit process.