地方政府博弈行为与长三角一体化的制度设计研究

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在长三角经济一体化进程中,各级地方政府行为的地方保护主义、重复建设等问题日益凸现,如何进行区域经济协调及合理的制度安排,成为目前长三角一体化进程中急需解决的现实问题。本文对长三角地方政府的博弈行为进行研究,尝试提出长三角一体化的制度构想,为长三角一体化的实施提供一些参考建议。 In the process of economic integration in the Yangtze River Delta, local protectionism and redundant construction of local government at all levels have become increasingly prominent. How to carry out regional economic coordination and reasonable institutional arrangements has become an urgent problem to be solved in the process of the integration of the Yangtze River Delta . This paper studies the game behavior of the local governments in the Yangtze River Delta, tries to put forward the institutional conception of the integration of the Yangtze River Delta, and provides some suggestions for the integration of the Yangtze River Delta.
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