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考虑政府补贴、碳排放控制以及货主运输方式选择,提出基于航线运营者、货主和政府三方博弈关系的短途班轮航线优化模型。应用用户平衡原理,模型可优化航线配船与航线结构设计,计算恰当的政府补贴额。开发了基于时空网络拓展和Frank-Wolf算法的遗传算法求解模型,并对渤海西部短途航线进行了优化。研究结果表明:在政府补贴为1 121.28元.d-1时,运营者若采用9艘40 000t级滚装船在渤海西部区域各主要港口间布设单摆式航线,每船可获得704 567.12元.d-1的收益,碳排放强度下降约17.78%;若期望碳排放强度下降20%以上,运营者应采用8艘40 000t级滚装船做环绕航行,可为运营者带来956 264.83元.d-1的收益,使碳排放强度下降约27.23%,但需要政府提供56 075.26元.d-1的高额补助。计算结果符合预期,优化模型有效。
Considering the government subsidies, carbon emission control and the choice of transport modes for owners, this paper proposes an optimization model for short-haul liner routes based on the tripartite game relationship among route operators, shippers and the government. Applying the principle of user balance, the model can optimize the design of route allocation and route structure and calculate the appropriate amount of government subsidies. A genetic algorithm solving model based on space-time network expansion and Frank-Wolf algorithm was developed and the short-range route in western Bohai Sea was optimized. The results show that when the government subsidy is 1 121.28 yuan .d-1, if operators use nine 40,000-ton ro-ro ships to lay pendulum-type routes between the major ports in the western Bohai Sea area, they can get 704 567.12 yuan per boat .d-1 revenue, the intensity of carbon emissions decreased by about 17.78%; if the expected carbon intensity decreased by 20% or more, operators should use eight 40,000t class ro-ro to do around sailing, operators can bring 956,264.83 yuan .d-1 income, so that the intensity of carbon emissions decreased by about 27.23%, but requires the government to provide 56 075.26 yuan. D-1 high grants. The calculation results are in line with expectation and the optimization model is valid.