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针对多因素逆向组合拍卖,设计了QA-VCG机制,该机制既满足机制设计要求的基本性质,同时考虑了逆向组合拍卖中质量因素分配的新特征.在上述工作的基础上,以提高采购商收益为目的,设计了改进QA-VCG机制,改进QA-VCG机制既满足分配效率、激励相容和个体理性,同时显著提高了采购商收益量.在条件期望意义下,进一步证明了改进QA-VCG机制对于提高采购商期望收益的最优性.
For the multi-factor reverse combination auction, the QA-VCG mechanism is designed, which not only meets the basic nature of the mechanism design requirements, but also takes into account the new features of the quality factor allocation in the reverse combination auction.On the basis of above work, The purpose of this paper is to design an improved QA-VCG mechanism and to improve the QA-VCG mechanism to meet the distribution efficiency, incentive compatibility and individual rationality, and significantly increase the purchaser’s earnings.Under the expectation of conditions, it is further proved that improving QA- The Optimality of VCG Mechanism for Increasing Buyer Expected Return.